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ABSTRACT 
Federal Tax Autonomy and the Limits of Cooperation  
by Sebastian G. Kessing, Kai A. Konrad and Christos Kotsogiannis  
We consider the hold-up problem between a foreign direct investor and the 
government(s) in a host country with weak governmental structure and lack of 
power to commit. Using "Nash threats", we show that an efficient investment 
level can be sustained for a sufficiently high discount factor and ask whether a 
federal structure makes collusion more or less sustainable. We show that 
collusion between the government and the investor is easier to sustain if the 
host country is more centralized or if the government layers can commit to fixed 
sharing rules. 
 
Keywords: Tacit collusion, foreign direct investment, hold-up problem, federalism, 
vertical tax externality, tax competition 
JEL Classification: H11, H71, H73, H77 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Föderale Steuerautonomie und die Grenzen der Kooperation 
Wir betrachten das „Hold-up Problem“, das in den Beziehungen zwischen 
einem ausländischen Investor und der Regierung, bzw. den Regierungen eines  
Gastlandes mit schwachen institutionellen Strukturen besteht. Unter Ver-
wendung von Nash-Drohungen wird gezeigt, dass eine Überwindung des Hold-
up Problems durch wiederholte Interaktion zwischen den Akteuren möglich ist. 
Weiterhin wird untersucht, ob föderale Strukturen eine solche Überwindung 
wahrscheinlicher machen oder nicht. Schließlich wird gezeigt, dass eine 
Überwindung des Hold-up Problems besser gelingt, wenn die verschiedenen 
Regierungsebenen des Gastlandes sich bindend auf eine gemeinschafts-
steuerliche Aufteilung des Steueraufkommens festlegen können. 
 
1 Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is notoriously prone to risk. Once the in-
vestment is made, a large share of it is sunk, and the expected returns from
the investment may be diluted by changes in the host country’s policy. This
creates a hold-up problem, and some aspects of this problem have been care-
fully studied.1 Federalism and decentralisation are often regarded as impor-
tant policy instruments for overcoming this obstacle to FDI. For example,
in its latest World Development Report, which focusses on measures to fos-
ter investment, the World Bank highlights decentralization of policy-decision
making as conducive to attracting FDI. For, as it is argued, decentralization
‘permits a degree of institutional competition between centers of authority
that can. . . reduce the risk that governments will expropriate wealth’ (World
Bank, 2004, p. 53). This view is rooted in the notion that competition
between jurisdictions for mobile factors of production, coupled with joint
accountability of the levels of governments, makes ex-post opportunistic be-
havior more diﬃcult, (Weingast (1995), and Quian and Weingast (1997)).2
As Weingast (1995, pp. 5-6) most vividly puts it:
‘If a jurisdiction attempts to confiscate the wealth of an in-
dustry, the mobility of capital implies that firms will relocate.
The mobility of resources thus raises the economic cost of those
jurisdictions that might establish certain policies, and they will
do so only if the political benefits are worth these and other costs.
Federalism thus greatly diminishes the level of pervasiveness of
1See, for instance, among others, Eaton and Gersovitz (1983), Doyle and van Wijnber-
gen (1994), Thomas and Worrall (1994), Konrad and Lommerud (2001), Janeba (2000)
and Schnitzer (1999, 2002).
2This view can be traced back to Hayek (1939) and Tiebout (1956). That inter-
jurisdictional competition may serve as a welcome supplement to inadequate constitutional
constraints and imperfect political institutions has also been emphasized by Brennan and
Buchanan (1977, 1980).
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economic rent-seeking and the formation of distributional coali-
tions.’
This argument is important, and certainly applies to many types of invest-
ment, particularly human capital investment that, with its owner or owners,
can easily relocate.
However, once an international investor has invested in a given country
the hold-up problem is rooted in the immobility of capital. This casts doubt
on the plausibility of the argument that federal structures per se will atten-
uate the hold up problem. Does an increase in the number of competing
government actors actually reduce the likelihood of a hold-up and increase
investment levels? The aim of this paper is to analyze this question rigor-
ously. As stressed in previous work, the main element that prevents govern-
ments from expropriation and confiscatory taxation is the prospect of future
benefits from repeated investment (see, e.g., Eaton and Gersovitz (1983) or
Thomas and Worrall (1994)). We consider a simple framework of repeated
interaction between the foreign investor and the host country government(s),
which allows us to investigate whether a multi-layer structure of government
facilitates reaching eﬃcient FDI levels. We show that the opposite is true.
Federal countries, i.e. countries with a higher number of independent gov-
ernment levels, are less likely to achieve eﬃcient levels of FDI. The reason is
that, for each individual layer of government, the incentive to deviate from
the collusive outcome between governments is increased, and the future losses
are reduced.
Repeated interaction and ‘tacit collusion’ that could be sustained in in-
finitely repeated games has received limited attention in the public finance
literature on tax competition. Haufler and Schjelderup (2004), for instance,
consider commodity taxation in the context of an industry structure in which
firms may coordinate on a collusive outcome in an infinitely repeated game.
We consider collusion between the various layers of government and the firm
aimed at overcoming the hold-up problem, not the problem of forming or
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sustaining an industry cartel in oligopolistic markets. The question then
becomes whether collusion between the foreign direct investor and the gov-
ernment becomes more or less diﬃcult if the government consists of more
than one decision maker. We use a reduced-form model of federal fiscal
arrangements within which the relationship between federalism and the like-
lihood of tacit collusion can be articulated. We ask: does decentralization
(multi-level governance) enhance the range of discount factors that make
tacit collusion between the levels of government and an eﬃcient investment
level feasible, thereby making the federal economy a more attractive place
for FDI? We show that collusion is more diﬃcult, the more decentralized the
policy-decision making is.3
As an alternative to competition between independent layers of govern-
ment, we consider revenue sharing and find that appropriate and reliable
sharing rules make ongoing investment more likely to be sustainable than
in a situation in which all levels of government exercise their power to tax.
Also, with sharing rules in place, an increase in the number of government
actors does not aﬀect investment negatively. A reduction in competition be-
tween government levels can make investment more likely and contribute to
overcoming the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment.
Our analysis can be seen as a contribution to a literature that has recently
highlighted several problematic aspects of decentralization and that has also
tried to single out more precisely the specific conditions and institutional
provisions that are necessary for federalism to unleash its potential for im-
proving countries’ economic performance. For instance, an important feature
of the preceding usual eﬃciency argument for decentralization (‘federalism’)
is that it is developed in a hierarchical system within which there is a clear di-
3The problem is structurally related to the discussion in the context of competition
theory on the sustainability of collusion among firms (see, e.g., Tirole 1988, pp. 245n.),
in which the number of competitors plays a critical role. The main diﬀerence between
collusion in the hold-up problem and the collusion-in-oligopoly-markets problem is the
existence of the investor–the other side of the market–as an additional player.
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vision of powers, in which all spillovers, including vertical fiscal externalities
are absent by assumption or are contracted away. Vertical fiscal externalities
have recently been identified as a source of ineﬃciency in the context of tax
competition (see, for instance, among others, Wrede (1997, 2000) and Keen
and Kotsogiannis (2002, 2003, 2004)) and it has been argued that they are
diﬃcult to avoid, even if seemingly diﬀerent tax bases are assigned to diﬀerent
layers of government. Kessing, Konrad and Kotsogiannis (2005) considered
competition for FDI in a static fully non-cooperative tax-competition frame-
work and show that vertical interdependencies in a federally organized host
country puts such a country in a disadvantaged position vis-a-vis unitary
states. They also provide empirical evidence that, for transition countries,
the number of government layers aﬀects the level of FDI inflows negatively.
Treisman (1999a, 1999b, 2002, 2003) has put forward a number of further
arguments why decentralization may lead to a less satisfactory performance,
and Cai and Treisman (2002) show that the disciplinary eﬀect of interre-
gional competition, even where it could be at work in principle, may lead to
adverse eﬀects if regions are asymmetric, making some of them drive out all
mobile capital and specialize on a high level of oppression. This and other
consequences of a federal structure may also reduce FDI. Their argument
addresses the alleged benefits from horizontal interregional competition. We
concentrate on the aspect of vertical disintegrated government systems.
Our results are directly relevant for the increasing amount of evidence
that the organisation of inter-governmental fiscal relations plays a crucial
role for investment, tax revenues and overall economic performance of tran-
sition and developing countries. The cases of Russia and China have received
particular attention, see Zhuravskaya (2000), Berkovitz and Li (2000) and Jin
et al. (2004), among others. The success of the fiscal arrangements of local
governments with higher levels of government in China stands in contrast to
the disarray of federal fiscal relations in Russia. Jin et al. (2004) document
the reliability and durability of a system of revenue sharing between the lo-
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cal governments and higher levels of government in China. By contrast, as
analyzed by Berkovitz and Li (2000), Russia suﬀered from a common pool
tax problem. Our results on the beneficial eﬀects of sharing rules provide
a clear explanation for the success of the Chinese fiscal arrangements which
can be contrasted with the problems in Russia that follow our analysis of the
eﬀects of independent taxation in federal systems on the hold-up problem.4
Section 2 develops the analytical framework and explores the potential for
tacit collusion. Section 3 considers revenue sharing and section 4 concludes.
2 The hold-up problem and cooperation
We consider an economy with a hierarchy of n symmetric and fiscally au-
tonomous levels of government, and with one governmental player on each
level of government.5 For n = 1 this structure refers to a unitary system of
governance whereas for n > 1 it refers to a federation with several layers of
government. There is a common tax base from which each level of govern-
ment draws its revenues. To address the issue of whether collusive behavior
in the repeated game between a foreign direct investor and the government(s)
in the host country is more easily sustained in a federal or a unitary country,
the analytical framework makes use of some of the elements and assumptions
introduced in Eaton and Gersowitz (1983). We consider a foreign direct in-
4As described by Shleifer and Treisman (2000), revenue sharing also existed in Russia
for some taxes. However, the existing sharing schemes suﬀered from unreliability, oﬀ-
setting changes in fiscal tranfers from higher levels of government, and other forms of
negative eﬀects. This points to the problem of establishing reliability of such schemes in
the context of host countries with weak institutions in the first place, a problem that will
not be discussed in our analysis.
5Intentionally, we abstract from the fact that, typically, lower levels of government
do not consist of one government, but of a larger number of regional governments with
non-overlapping jurisdictions. Qualitatively our results generalize, as long as once the
investment decision is made the foreign direct investment is fixed and cannot move from
one region to another.
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vestor who repeatedly makes an investment and chooses whether, and how
much, to invest in a host country in periods j = 1, 2, . . .. The returns to
investment accrue in each period j and they are subject to taxes in the host
country.
The stage game Consider the stage game in period j. The timing within
the period is as follows. First the investor chooses an amount kj ≥ 0, at the
beginning of the period. This investment is irreversible and the cost is sunk
once the investment is made. The cost is given by
C(kj) = k2j , for periods j = 1, 2, . . . (1)
and is fully born by the investor and investment is fixed for the rest of the
period and fully depreciates at the end of period j. Accordingly, investment
in any given period j does not directly aﬀect the capital stock in future
periods. The investment yields a return at the end of period j and this
return is proportional to the size of the investment, and equal to akj, with
a > 0. The return to investment accrues in units of the universal good that
is freely transferable across country borders.
Once the investment choice is made and observable, each of the n govern-
ment layers i in the host country chooses its action γij , with γij ∈ [0, 1]. This
γij is called the share in the investment return that is demanded by govern-
ment i, or government i’s demanded share. These share demands translate
in tax shares, as follows. The actual tax rate tij, and hence, the share in the
gross returns received by government i in period j is
tij =
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
γij if
nP
k=1
γkj ≤ 1
γij
nS
k=1
γkj
if
nP
k=1
γkj > 1
. (2)
The function in (2) says that tij = γij and each government i receives a share
in the returns that equals the share it demands if the sum of all allocations
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chosen by all n governments does not exceed 100 percent. If, on the other
hand, the sum of the allocations exceed 100 percent, then each government
is rationed and the rationing mechanism in (2) suggests that each receives
only a constant fraction of its chosen share.6
Once the shares demanded are chosen, the actual taxes tij can be calcu-
lated. The returns from investment accrue and are allocated between the
investor and the diﬀerent layers of government according to (t1j , ..., tnj ), and
this allow the period payoﬀs of the investor and the diﬀerent government
layers to be stated. For this purpose, define
tj =
nX
i=1
tij (3)
to be sum of actual tax rates, and, hence, the aggregate share of gross returns
transferred to the governments. Recall that the levels of government share
in the gross return but not in the investment cost that generates this return.
The foreign investor cares about the return net of taxes and net of invest-
ment cost. Accordingly, the period j surplus of the investor is
πj = (1− tj)akj − k2j . (4)
Government i in period j receives payoﬀ equal to its tax share in the gross
return7 and is given by
T ij = tijakj . (5)
Before turning to the collusion outcomes, consider the Nash equilibrium
outcome, denoted by an (∗), of the single-shot stage game.
6One could certainly think of other functions specifying other rationing rules. But the
results are qualitatively similar for other share functions, provided that tij increases in the
government’s own desired share γij , and decreases in other governments’ desired shares.
7Although this preference specification is restrictive, the introduction of benevolent
governments that redistribute their tax revenues as public goods will yield similar results,
but at the cost of cumbersome analytics.
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Proposition 1 In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the single-shot stage
game, the investor chooses k∗j = 0. Governments choose γi∗j = 1 if kj > 0
and γi∗j ∈ [0, 1] arbitrarily if kj = 0. The equilibrium payoﬀs are uniquely
determined as k∗j = π∗j = T i∗j = 0.
Since investment is made and is sunk, whenever there is some revenue,
the governments will maximize their own share in the gross revenue from
the investment. Hence, all positive revenue will be fully confiscated. The
investor, anticipating this expropriatory behavior, optimally chooses an in-
vestment that is equal to zero, which, in turn, generates zero gross returns
and zero payoﬀs for all players in the game. This Nash equilibrium is unique
in its payoﬀs.
Infinite repetition Turn now to the case in which the stage game is in-
finitely repeated. Note first that play as in the single-shot stage game con-
stitutes a subgame perfect equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game. A
switch to this subgame perfect equilibrium for all future periods will be used
as the threat to establish tacit collusion.
We consider conditions for which the fully eﬃcient investment level can
be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium, assuming that players switch
to the unique subgame perfect equilibrium that is characterized in Proposi-
tion 1 for all periods j0+1, j0+2, . . . if a deviation occurs in period j0. This
reversion to the Nash equilibrium of the single-shot game, once a deviation
has occurred, is a standard example of a credible penal code proposed by
Friedman (1971).
First we characterize the set of eﬃcient allocations in any period (stage
game) obtained from maximizing the sum of each and every period j payoﬀs
given by (4) and (5) for all i = 1, . . . , n, that is
π +
nX
i=1
T i = ak − k2. (6)
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The period subscript is suppressed here and in much of what follows. The
investment choice that maximizes (6) is unique and equal to
k =
a
2
. (7)
Turning to collusive equilibria, we focus on stationary equilibria, that is,
on equilibria in which the tax rates and capital choices are constant over
time, and on equilibria that are symmetric with respect to the diﬀerent gov-
ernmental bodies that is, on equilibria in which γij = γj/n for all periods
j. The period payoﬀs in a symmetric stationary equilibrium that supports
eﬃcient investment are given by
πˆ =
¡
1− tˆ
¢ a2
2
−
³a
2
´2
, (8)
for the foreign direct investor, and
Tˆ i =
tˆ
n
a2
2
, (9)
for government i, i = 1, . . . , n, where the ’hat’ denotes these equilibrium
values. In any collusive stationary symmetric equilibrium, the investor must
receive at least a zero payoﬀ, as he can obtain this payoﬀ regardless of the
governments’ demands by simply not investing. Hence, an upper limit for
the aggregate tax that is compatible with a stationary collusive equilibrium
with eﬃcient investment by the foreign direct investor is the level of tax tˆ
that makes the payoﬀ in (8) equal to zero. This aggregate tax rate is given
by
tˆ = 1/2 . (10)
Denoting the discount factor for all players by δ ∈ (0, 1), and assuming
that δ is time invariant and the same for all players, the discounted present
value of the sum of all period payoﬀs is obtained by multiplying πˆ and Tˆ i
with 1
1−δ . We can now state the following proposition:
9
Proposition 2 Consider the set of stationary symmetric subgame perfect
equilibria which are characterized by (k˘, t˘) and by reversion to the non-cooperative
stage game for all future periods j1, j2, ... if (kj0, tj0) 6= (k˘, t˘). Eﬃcient invest-
ment (7) and tax revenues (10) can be sustained as such an equilibrium,
denoted as (kˆ, tˆ), if
δ > 1− 3
4n
+
1
4n2
≡ δˆ(n). (11)
Proof. It follows from stationarity, symmetry and equations (9) and (10)
that in the collusive equilibrium (kˆ, tˆ), the present value of the sum of period
payoﬀs for each single government i, i = 1, . . . , n, is given by
1
1− δ
1
n
a2
4
, (12)
and the present value of the sum of period payoﬀs of the investor is zero. To
see whether this equilibrium can be sustained, we need to compare it with
the outcome from a unilateral deviation, for each player, in a given period.
Consider, first, deviations by the investor. If the investor deviates from
kj = a/2 in a given period j, as all players anticipate that all players’ period
payoﬀs in all future periods will be zero, subgame perfect equilibrium tax
choices in period j will imply that government i, i = 1, . . . , n demands γij = 1,
and thus each receives a share 1/n of the gross returns of the investment,
whereas the investor makes a non-positive payoﬀ or loss from his investment
equal to his investment cost. Accordingly, the investor has no incentive to
deviate from this candidate equilibrium.
Turn to a government h. A unilateral deviation from γˆhj = 12n , taking into
consideration that other governments choose γˆij = 12n for i 6= h , and, hence,Pn
k 6=h γˆ
k = (n−1)/(2n), following (2), the deviation that yields h the highest
share in the given investment returns is γhj = 1 and yields t¯hj = (2n)/(3n−1)
and period profit denoted by T¯ hj , equal to
T¯ hj =
2n
3n− 1
a2
2
, (13)
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and zero period tax revenues and profits in all future periods. Here the
’bar’ denotes variables that relate to the optimal unilateral deviation by one
player. A comparison between (12) and (13) reveals that a deviation from
the collusive outcome is profitable for a typical government h if and only if
T¯ hj ≡
2n
3n− 1
a2
2
> 1
1− δ
1
2n
a2
2
=
1
1− δ Tˆ
h . (14)
The maximum discount factor for which inequality holds in (14) yields the
maximum discount factor, denoted δˆ(n), as in (11). ¤
Proposition 2 shows that governments and the investor can tacitly collude
and overcome the hold-up problem if δ > δˆ, based on what is sometimes called
a "Nash-threats" folk theorem (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.154). As is
well known, reversion to the subgame perfect equilibrium in which the non-
cooperative stage game equilibrium is played for all times is a reasonable
assumption, but it is often not the only reasonable punishment strategy.
However, it yields a simple and important benchmark case that can be used
to carry out comparative statics.
Equipped with Proposition 2, we ask whether sustainability of the col-
lusive outcome becomes more diﬃcult with an increase in the number of
governments. The answer to this is aﬃrmative. To see this, diﬀerentiate the
right hand side of (11) with respect to the number of governments, n, to
obtain
dδˆ(n)
dn
=
3n− 2
4n3
> 0 . (15)
We state this is as a proposition:
Proposition 3 The collusive outcome that is characterized in Proposition 2
is sustainable for a lower discount factor the smaller the number of govern-
ment layers in the host country.
Intuitively, if there is more than one government, this has two main ef-
fects. Each government receives a smaller share of the revenues in the col-
lusive and in the non-collusive outcome. In general, this makes the outcome
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of an increase in the number of governments indeterminate. However, if the
players revert to the Nash equilibrium of the stage game, each government’s
revenue becomes zero, independent of the number of governments. The first
eﬀect therefore strictly dominates here. This observation has two implica-
tions. Firstly, the gain from deviating increases for each government (since
by having a small share of the revenues each government would gain more by
capturing the federation tax base). Secondly, for each government, the ben-
efit from maintaining the collusive outcome is reduced because it receives an
ever reducing share of the collusive revenues. This implies that the short-run
gain from deviating increases, while the long-run benefit of maintaining the
collusive outcome is reduced. The results in Propositions 1 and 2 have been
shown only for the case in which all players revert to the unique Nash equilib-
rium in the stage game for all future periods if one of the players deviates from
the eﬃcient equilibrium with maximum tax revenue. Collusion might be sus-
tained for lower discount factors if more sophisticated punishment strategies
are considered. However, the reversion to the non-cooperative stage game
equilibrium seems to be a simple and natural benchmark for a comparison
of unitary and federal states.
3 Revenue sharing
A central aspect of our analysis is the fact that each level of government
acts independently. While this certainly describes well the situation in many
developing and transition countries, a number of recent contributions found
that diﬀerences in the organisation of federal fiscal relations can have strong
eﬀects on investment and growth. In particular, Jin et al. (2004) have
stressed the importance and the positive impact of revenue sharing agree-
ments in China. The eﬀects of such sharing rules for the sustainability of
collusive eﬃcient outcomes can also be analysed. Let only one government
level, say i = 1, choose the aggregate tax t. Let the resulting tax revenue be
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shared equally among all governments, i.e., tk = t/n for all k = 1, ..., n.
Again, an equilibrium with eﬃcient investment and zero after-tax profits
for the firm can be sustained with a suﬃciently low discount rate. The tax
tˆ set by government 1 in this equilibrium is exactly the same as in section
2. Consequently, the tax revenue received by each level of government is
also the same as in the collusive outcome with n individual taxes. Since the
overall taxes and tax revenues are the same, the firm’s payoﬀ is again equal to
zero and each government’s payoﬀ, including government 1’s, is given by (9).
However, the sustainability of the equilibrium with investment is changed.
If government 1 chooses to deviate, it takes the entire period revenue of the
firm, but gets to keep only 1/n-th of the revenue. Hence, the government’s
deviation payoﬀ, again denoted by T¯ 1, is
T¯ 1 =
a2
2n
. (16)
To find the critical discount rate that allows collusion to be sustained under
revenue sharing, we must again compare the payoﬀ from deviating with the
collusion payoﬀ
a2
2n
>
1
1− δ
1
2n
a2
2
. (17)
Solving this inequality for the critical δ we find that tacit collusion can be
sustained for all
δ >
1
2
. (18)
Comparing (18) with (11) gives our next proposition:
Proposition 4 For any number of government levels n, revenue sharing can
sustain eﬃcient investment and maximum taxation as a symmetric station-
ary equilibrium, with the non-cooperative stage game as trigger strategies,
for lower discount factors than in the case of independent taxation by the
diﬀerent levels of government.
The immediate gain from deviating has to be split with the other levels of
government. This makes it less attractive to deviate. The result provides an
13
insight of why appropriate organisation of inter-governmental fiscal relations
with monopolized revenue collection, however, with reliably institutionalized
sharing rules, have been successful in attracting investment and generating
tax revenues. The critical discount factor with revenue sharing (18) reveals
another interesting property. Since (18) is independent of the number of
government layers, we can directly summarize the eﬀect of increasing the
number of government layers in the case of revenue sharing:
Proposition 5 With revenue sharing, the sustainability of an equilibrium
with eﬃcient investment is independent of the number of government layers
in the host country.
This contrasts with Proposition 3. In the case of revenue sharing, the
negative eﬀect of an increase in government actors can be avoided. Federalism
with tax revenue sharing rules avoids the problems identified for multiple
government layers with independent power to tax.
These results show that revenue sharing can play a beneficial role in over-
coming the hold-up problem in foreign direct investment. This contrasts with
the more critical view on revenue sharing more generally, which has been ar-
ticulated, in particular, for horizontally related leviathans as in Brennan and
Buchanan (1980), which maintains that revenue sharing rules are a way for
leviathan governments to stabilize cartels between them. Indeed, revenue
sharing facilitates collusion, but this collusion includes the investor and over-
comes a dynamic ineﬃciency. Such revenue sharing schemes have also been
criticized for generating insuﬃcient incentives for government that collects
the taxes to choose suﬃcient tax collection eﬀort, particularly if this eﬀort
is not perfectly observable: the government often pays the full marginal cost
of additional administrative eﬀort, but receives only a share in the marginal
tax revenue, and this yields moral hazard incentives.8
8For instance, for Germany, see Baretti, Huber and Lichtblau (2002).
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This reveals a trade-oﬀ when choosing between independent revenue col-
lection and revenue sharing. Advanced countries have typically developed
other institutions that can overcome the hold-up problem, so that the posi-
tive eﬀects of such schemes for FDI are not so important. In countries with
weaker institutions, appropriately designed and reliable sharing rules can play
an important role in overcoming the hold-up problem, and the commitment
benefits may outweigh the disadvantages that revenue sharing might have.
Of course, the viability of implementing well-functioning sharing schemes it-
self relies on the capability of the government layers involved to stick to the
agreed scheme. This need not be the case. After all, this is a commitment
problem that is not too diﬀerent from the commitment problem that gen-
erates the hold-up problem. As Shleifer and Treisman (2000) describe, this
lack of commitment has been precisely the problem in Russia, where higher
levels of government have frequently readjusted transfers or sharing agree-
ments with lower levels of government. Countries in which the diﬀerent layers
of government can commit vis-a-vis each other on a revenue sharing regime
also improve their ability to enter into a collusive equilibrium to overcome
the hold-up problem with respect to FDI.
4 Conclusions
Federalism and decentralization are often seen as appropriate tools for over-
coming the hold-up problem in FDI. Our analysis challenges this view. Re-
cent work has emphasized the potential vertical tax externalities in federal
systems. Taking these externalities as given, we asked whether tacit collusion
between the investor and the governments of the diﬀerent layers is feasible in
an infinite horizon game and whether a larger number of governments helps
to overcome the problem. For a particular class of tacit collusion equilibria
we have shown that it does not: cooperation is more diﬃcult to sustain in
more decentralized federations.
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However, an appropriate and reliable system of revenue sharing can eﬀec-
tively reduce the problems of multi-level government. With revenue sharing,
the negative eﬀects of federalism on the sustainability of investment disap-
pear. Contrary to the perceived wisdom, a reduction in the competition
between levels of government caused by the introduction of revenue sharing
can be conducive to foreign investment. Thus, decentralization is not per se
good or bad for investment, but its eﬀects depend on the organisation of the
inter-governmental fiscal relations. Our results are in line with the recent
success of the Chinese and failure of the Russian federal systems to attract
FDI.
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